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ABSTRACT 
 This study examines the shift of Attorney General Guidelines in the wake of 
September 11th, 2001, and the consequences for both federal law enforcement and federal 
prosecutors.  Previous research has found that prosecutors are more apt to use an 
exceptional vagueness approach and try terrorists like traditional offenders.  Likewise, 
terrorist are more likely to act like traditional offenders and plead guilty in the post-9/11 
era.  This study further supports the existing knowledge by providing evidence of 
increased plea bargain rates post-9/11 of terrorists.  In addition, this study is important 
because it examines the consequences of the early intervention approach and its effect on 
the prevention of terrorism in the United States. 
 The first and primary research question examines whether the proactive approach 
adopted after the attacks on September 11, 2001, has been effective in preventing terrorist 
attacks.  The results indicated a decrease in terrorism incidents post-9/11.  The second 
research question investigates the changes prosecutors have made to prosecute and 
charge defendants as a result of the shift from reactive to proactive policies.  The majority 
of the hypotheses developed under this research question were supported, such as fewer 
counts per indictment, fewer defendants per case, and increases in plea bargains.  
However, count severity appears to remain consistent pre and post-9/11.  The third 
research question examines the amount of evidence prosecutors have pre-9/11 to post-
9/11 and the quantity of unconvicted counts per indictment in each era.  The findings 
supported a decrease in evidence post-9/11 and an increase in unconvicted counts per 
indictment post-9/11.  The final research question examines the change in conviction rate 
pre and post-9/11.  The results indicate no change in the conviction rate pre-9/11 to post 
9/11.   
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I. Introduction 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft 
implemented a change in policy to combat terrorism.  In previous administrations, the 
FBI took a more reactive approach to fight terrorism that stressed targeting the leadership 
of terrorists groups and building a strong case against the group through informants and 
undercover agents.  After September 11th, it was clear that, due to a lack of information 
sharing among agencies a change in policy was needed.  The enactment of the 2002 
Ashcroft guidelines focused on intercepting and interrupting terror groups before plans 
could be made and fulfilled.  The FBI sought to prevent future incidents by arresting 
terrorists for less severe charges and deterring further conspiracies from developing.  The 
FBI, under the 2008 Mukasey Guidelines, were identified as an intelligence agency and 
given greater power in order to become a more proactive agency. 
 The goal of this study is to determine if the ‘early intervention’ approach has been 
successful in preventing terrorist incidents as well as if the policy changes employed after 
9/11 have had an impact on how the federal government investigates and prosecutes 
those suspected of partaking in terrorism.  I developed four research questions to 
investigate these inquiries. The first and primary research question examined whether the 
proactive approach adopted after the attacks on September 11, 2001, has been effective in 
preventing terrorist attacks.  The next research question analyzed the changes prosecutors 
have made to prosecute and charge defendants as a result of the shift from reactive to 
proactive policies.  The third research question compared the amount of evidence 
prosecutors have pre-9/11 to post-9/11 and the quantity of unconvicted counts per 
indictment in each era.  The final research question examined the change in conviction 
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rate pre and post-9/11.  This question looked to determine if the proactive policy changes 
adopted by prosecutors to process cases and charge defendants more quickly post-9/11 
had an impact on the overall conviction of terrorists. 
II. Background 
 Although the United States witnessed a rise in terrorism in the 1980s, it wasn’t 
until the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 that 
terrorism became a topic of household discussion across the nation (Smith 1994).  At that 
time, the Oklahoma City Bombing was the first successful large-scale act of terrorism on 
American soil to produce mass causalities.  This event highlighted the threat of domestic 
terrorism in the United States (Damphousse & Shields 2007).  Six years later, in the early 
morning hours of September 11, 2001, Islamic terrorists took the lives of roughly 3,000 
victims along the East Coast.  Replicating a multiple airline hijacking that spawned the 
creation of Black September nearly thirty years prior, the terrorists successfully crashed 
into the World Trade Center (WTC) towers and the Pentagon.  Both the bombing of the 
Murrah Federal Building and the attacks on 9/11, created a demand for increased security 
from the American people.   These two events incited negative media attention that 
focused on the government and forced a change in policy to combat terrorism. 
 Because the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has exclusive authority to 
investigate acts of terrorism in the United States and against American citizens and 
property abroad, that agency was most directly affected by the demands for policy 
change.  Knowledge of the policies used to guide FBI terrorism investigations is critical 
to understanding the changes that affected the agency.  The FBI defines terrorism as “the 
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
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government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or 
social goals” (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85).  This definition has remained fairly consistent 
over the past three decades.  The regulations that determine how this definition is 
interpreted, however, have changed substantially over the years.   
 The FBI’s authority and responsibility to investigate domestic terrorism cases is 
outlined in the “Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering 
Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations” (1981; 1989; 2002).  
International terrorism cases are investigated under the “Attorney General’s Guidelines 
for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations.”1  
New guidelines in 2008 eliminated the distinctions among these types of investigations. 
The aforementioned Attorney General Guidelines outlined the requisites for 
launching a terrorism investigation, and set the minimum requirements of each case 
(Shields et al. 2009).  During the Hoover administration, the FBI maintained a lionized 
reputation as a distinguished agency.  However, the Watergate scandal revealed gross 
wrongdoings of the agencies’ practices and extensive changes followed (Poveda 1990).  
The adoption of the Levi Guidelines on April 5, 1976 (named after Attorney General 
Edward Levi), was a reflection of the nation’s discontent, and this regulation greatly 
restricted the freedoms the organization once enjoyed (Smith 1994). The threat of 
terrorism resurfaced with the robbery of a Brinks armored truck in Nyack, New York, on 
October 20, 1981.  Evidence later revealed that the attack was carried out by the 
                                                          
1 This information was derived from the Terrorist Research and Analytical Center’s 
annual report entitled Terrorism in the United States.  This report documents each 
specific year’s incidents, suspected incidents, preventions and significant 
accomplishments.  It also analyses trends and patterns by group, target, and type of 
terrorist incident.   The report further examines topical issues and current threats. 
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combined efforts of numerous left-wing terrorist groups (Smith 1994).  The constricting 
Levi Guidelines were relaxed and the FBI was given greater flexibility under the new 
Attorney General Smith Guidelines (after Attorney General William French Smith) 
(Smith 1994).  Although the Oklahoma City bombing resulted in a critical appraisal of 
the AG Guidelines, little changes occurred in either their wording or interpretation 
(Congressional Hearing May 1995).  The Smith Guidelines exhibited a more balanced 
approach.  These guidelines remained in effect, with only minor changes until after the 
9/11 attacks.  But after the attacks on September 11th, further changes to the AG 
Guidelines resulted in a return to pre-1976 era strategies. The Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, and the Ashcroft Guidelines (after Attorney General John 
Ashcroft) implemented in May 2002, greatly increased the FBI’s capacity in investigative 
procedures including the nature, length and scope of such investigations.    
In previous administrations, the FBI took a more reactive approach to fight 
terrorism.  This counterterrorism strategy “emphasized the ‘decapitation’ of the 
leadership of terrorist organizations in an effort to gain ‘early interdiction of unlawful 
activity’” (Smith 1994: 12).  In other words, this strategy was aimed at targeting the 
leaders of terrorist groups and gaining sufficient evidence to build a case against the 
principal activists (Shields et al. 2009).  These investigations involved greater use of 
informants and undercover agents who infiltrated these groups.     
After September 11th, it was obvious that, due to a lack of information sharing 
within and among all levels of intelligence, as well as law enforcement communities, a 
change in policy was needed.  The enactment of the 2002 Ashcroft guidelines focused on 
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intercepting and interrupting terror groups before plans could be made and perpetrated.  
The FBI sought to prevent future incidents by arresting terrorists for less severe charges 
and deterring further conspiracies from developing.  The 2008 Mukasey Guidelines (after 
Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey), redefined the FBI’s role as an intelligence 
agency and further broadened the bureau’s powers in the hope of it becoming a more 
proactive agency. 
III. Literature Review 
 Policy changes employed after 9/11 have had a prominent impact on how the 
federal government investigates and prosecutes those suspected of partaking in terrorism 
(Shields et al. 2009).  The “early intervention” approach of post-9/11 generated an 
increase in the number of terrorism cases prosecuted, changes in the type of prosecution 
strategy used, and placed special emphasis on criminal acts that were previously 
overlooked (Shields et al. 2009).  Attorney General Ashcroft’s policy demanded a more 
rapid prosecution of suspected terrorists as soon as there was enough evidence of any 
transgression to win a conviction.  These offenses, whether terror-related or not, resulted 
in a considerable increase of cases prosecuted post-9/11(Shields et al. 2009).  
Theoretical Framework 
One theoretical model used to explain governmental responses to terrorism is 
Hagan’s “structural-contextual” theory (Hagan 1980).  According to Hagan, the different 
branches of the criminal justice system work autonomously without much cross 
communication.  He refers to this system as “loosely coupled” (Hagan 1989: 118).  
However, Hagan stated that in crimes associated with intense federal responses, such as 
the war on drugs, political power becomes a major factor in bringing that specific crime 
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into focus of the political figures, law enforcement, and the public.  This aspect of 
Hagan’s theory was later referred to as a “proactive political environment” (Smith and 
Damphousse 1998:71).  A proactive political environment is defined as “contexts where 
the surrounding political environment has mandated departures from normal criminal 
justice operations” (Smith and Damphousse 1998:72).  In these circumstances, a 
tightening of proactive techniques arises, “leading to a more tightly coupled criminal 
system” (Smith and Damphousse 1998:72).  A tightly coupled system occurs when 
resources are focused on a particular form of criminality from various arms of the 
criminal justice system (Shields 2008).  Transparency and enhanced communication 
between departments are characteristics of a tightly coupled criminal system.  Hagan 
proposes that when these branches function collectively as a result of this tightly coupled 
system, the levels of explained variance in sentence outcomes will decrease because of 
less discretion on the part of police, prosecutors, and judges. 
Hagan’s theory can be readily applied to terrorism as it elicits an intense federal 
response.  After September 11th, terrorism became a top political priority, creating a more 
proactive political environment.  This tightening of proactive techniques generated a 
change in the Attorney General Guidelines from a restricted model to one with expanded 
FBI freedom in investigative strategies. The tightening of proactive techniques also aided 
in the development of the USA PATRIOT Act as well as the creation of the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS). 
 The most obvious goal of a more tightly coupled system is to increase conviction 
rates by improving lines of communication and cooperation between law enforcement 
agencies and the judicial system.  How this might be accomplished, while also pursuing a 
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more proactive policing agenda, is questionable.  However, a more tightly coupled 
system should produce a greater rate of less severe crimes prosecuted.  The prosecution 
of crimes with lower count severity may indicate that offenders are being apprehended 
before a higher count severity crime is committed.  Thus, a more proactive criminal 
justice system is created.  Shifts to a more proactive policing model, combined with a 
tightly coupled system, may also affect other aspects of the prosecutorial effort.  These 
changes may also be manifested in alterations to charge strategies, plea rates, and 
conviction rates.  
Prosecution Strategies 
 There are three main strategies that prosecutors employ in a domestic terrorism 
enterprise case.  These concepts were first developed by Turk (2002) and later expanded 
by Smith and Damphousse (Smith et al. 2002).  The first approach, called explicit 
politicality, is used when there is greater public consensus that the offenders are terrorists 
(Turks 1982).  Characteristics of explicit politicality include using the terrorist label, 
ample examination of the defendants’ motives, and the use of charges that allude to a 
facet of conspiracy (Shields et al. 2009).  A central focus on the offender’s political 
motivation has been shown to hinder successful prosecution by forcing prosecutors to 
establish motive (Shields 2008, Bradley-Engen et al. 2009).  America has often avoided 
the concept of “political crime”, and has experienced failures in using the  explicit 
politicality prosecution-style, as seen in a number of high profile terrorism cases in the 
late 1980s (Bradley-Engen et al. 2009, Smith, 1994).   
 If there is greater conflict in public opinion that offenders are terrorists, the 
prosecutor will likely utilize the exceptional vagueness approach.  This strategy involves 
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treating the defendant like a ‘traditional’ offender.  This tactic intentionally avoids the 
mention of terrorism.  After 9/11, the preferred approach by prosecutors appears to be 
trying terrorists more like ‘traditional’ offenders, using exceptional vagueness in what is 
known as a diffusion case (refer to Figure A) (Chesney 2007, Shields 2009). 
 The third strategy used by prosecutors, referred to as political innuendo, charges 
defendants on “presumed liability statutes or with some ‘traditional’ crimes where motive 
was not an issue” (Shields et al. 2009: 133).  However, at bail hearings, trials, and later at 
sentencing, prosecutors would provide subtle, and not so subtle, clues linking the 
defendant to a terrorist group or ideology (Shields et al. 2009).  All of these strategies 
affect the plea bargaining process. 
Plea Bargaining 
 Plea bargaining, often a source of controversy, “is a legal negotiation between the 
prosecutor and the defense lawyer or client to reach an agreement that avoids a court 
trial” and is commonly used in the criminal justice system (Hess and Orthmann 2009: 
504).  Numerous factors and decisions have come to the forefront when evaluating the 
option of plea bargaining.  According to Emmelman (1996), the defense attorney must 
first estimate the value of a case by determining the prospect of a conviction via trial.  
Assessments of this possibility produce three contingent actions: plea bargain 
immediately, proceed further, or go to trial.  The defense attorney’s knowledge and 
understanding of the case leads him or her to the formulation of these tailored negotiating 
procedures.  The final aspect of this process requires the defense attorney to counsel the 
defendant on the best course of action.  Emmelman calls this activity “recursive decision 
making,” which occurs continuously until the culmination of the case (1996:355). 
9 
 
 The prosecutor is also a major player in the plea bargaining process.  At least four 
factors have been linked to the prosecutors’ decision making process.  These variables 
comprise the “evidentiary strength of the defendant’s case, the seriousness of the crime 
charged, the defendant’s criminal record, and extra-legal variables such as gender and 
race” (Harris and Springer 1984: 245).  Shields et al. (2006) demonstrated that strength of 
evidence is the greatest factor in determining if a prosecutor would pursue or drop a 
terrorism case, supporting Harris and Springer’s conclusions. 
Previous research indicates that terrorists plea bargain at a lesser rate than traditional 
defendants (Shields et al. 2006).  Roughly 90% of felony defendants in the United States 
plea bargain while less than 50% of terrorist cases end in plea bargains (Shields et al. 
2006).  This can be attributed to the fact that terrorists are unlike traditional defendants 
and are motivated by political or social agendas (Shields et al. 2006). 
Prosecutors’ policies toward plea bargaining are often influenced by the current 
political environment.   In the new early intervention era under the direction of Attorney 
General Ashcroft, the FBI and U.S. attorneys were expected to intercept and prosecute 
cases sooner.  This focus on intercepting and interrupting terror groups before plans could 
be made and executed, presumably lowers the amount of evidence necessary to pursue 
event-linked cases (refer to Figure A) (Shields et al. 2009).  As a consequence, more 
straightforward cases were prosecuted, and defendants were treated like ‘traditional’ 
offenders to a greater degree (Shields et al. 2009).   As a result of this paradigm shift, 
much like ‘traditional’ offenders, terrorist defendants in Shields et al. study were more 
likely to plead guilty in the post-9/11 era.  These changes also affected conviction rates 
post September 11th.  
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Convictions 
 Convicting and sentencing a terrorist is complicated.  Terrorism is the most basic 
illustration of a politically motivated crime.  This complexity of associating a defendant 
to a politically motivated crime is not always straight forward, and punishing these 
persons more harshly than other non-political criminals can lead to some contention in a 
society that prides itself on rights of free speech and assembly (Smith 1994, Bradley-
Engen 2009).  America avoided prosecuting ‘political crimes’ for precisely these 
challenges.  Nevertheless, September 11th forced the United States to confront the matter 
of terrorism directly.  Conviction rates are one measure of how successful a new policy’s 
strategy has been at handling those challenges. 
As noted earlier, the intervention strategy imposed after September 11th had a 
pronounced effect on prosecution techniques.  Chesney (2007) developed case types by 
terrorism link called “event-linked, pretextual, and diffusion cases”.  These concepts were 
later expanded by Shields (2008).  Event-linked cases are cases in which a defendant is 
linked to a terrorist group or ideology and then indicted on charges related to an act of 
terrorism (planned or completed) (Shields et al. 2009).  Pretextual cases are cases where 
the defendant is charged with crimes not directly related to an act of terrorism, but is 
linked to terrorist group or ideology (Shields et al. 2009).  In diffusion cases, the 
prosecutor focuses on particular types of crimes a terrorist is likely to engage in, and 
prosecutes all violators with extra vigor.  The hope is that by making it harder for anyone 
to engage in that activity, the prosecutor is making it harder for the terrorists as well—
therefore diffusing potential terrorist plots before they can take seed (Shields et al. 2009). 
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These terms and their associated meanings have been operationalized and are 
available for reference in Figure A.  Prior to 9/11 event-linked cases accounted for 
roughly 85% of all terrorism cases (Shields et al. 2009).  In contrast, pretextual cases 
represented only 15% (Shields et al. 2009).  After the new policy was implemented, 
diffusion cases represented nearly half of the cases prosecuted.  As expected, with the 
reduced amount of evidence available to U.S. prosecutors, event-liked cases greatly 
decreased while pretextual cases nearly tripled post-9/11 (Shields et al. 2009).  The 
significant increase in pretextual cases supports the proposition that the government has 
become more proactive and is intervening earlier.  
Under the new paradigm, Shields et al, (2009) predicted that limited evidence 
gathering from undercover agents and informants would result in fewer convictions 
(137).  Current research shows an increase in conviction rates across all case-types 
(event-linked, pretextual, and diffusion) amid a significant decline in evidence collected 
from confidential informants and undercover agents (Shields et al. 2009).  This could be 
attributed to the FBI’s increased sphere of control to investigate terrorism cases for 
longer periods of time, and the use of more aggressive tactics. Shields (2009:144) 
concluded that “the conviction rates for terrorist defendants tried after 9/11 was 
significantly higher than it was before.”  
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
Figure A 
Case Type by Terrorism Link 
 
Case Type Linked to Extremist Group 
or Ideology 
Linked to a completed 
or planned act of 
terrorism 
 
Event-linjked 
 
Defendant(s) linked in 
case documents 
Defendants Linked in 
Case Documents 
  
Pretextual 
 
Defendant(s) linked in 
case documents 
No Link  
  
Diffusion* 
 
No Link No Link 
* It should be noted that some prosecutors have attempted to use circumstantial evidence 
to link a defendant to a terrorist organization/ideology. 
 
Source:  Shields, Christopher A. 2008. “An Analysis of Prosecutorial and Defense  
  Strategies in Federal Terrorism Trials from 1980 to 2004”. 
 
IV. Research Question 
 Counterterrorism is one of the main priorities of the Department of Justice since 
the attacks of September 11th.  Time and money have been invested and dispersed to alter 
policies and procedures in order to proactively fight terrorism.  The significance of this 
study is to determine whether the changes in the post-9/11 era have been effective in 
countering terrorism and if so, what kind of adjustments have been implemented in law 
enforcement and the judicial system. Based on the above discussion and literature review 
I have developed four research questions. 
1. Have the proactive polices of the post-9/11 era been successful in preventing 
terrorist incidents? 
The goal of the 2002 Ashcroft guidelines was to intercept and interrupt terrorist 
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groups before plans could be made and implemented. The FBI’s aim was to prevent 
another terrorism incident from occurring by arresting terrorists for less severe crimes in 
order to disrupt further terrorist activity.  The FBI, through the USA PATRIOT Act, has 
used more invasive investigation strategies to accomplish this goal.  If the FBI has been 
successful in intervening earlier, then prevented acts should increase and completed acts 
should decrease in the post-9/11 era.  Based on this information, I created the following 
hypothesis: 
 H1 Early intervention should result in an increase in the ratio of prevented to 
completed acts of terror in the post-9/11 era. 
 If the government has adopted a proactive approach, the prosecution of these 
cases would also have to shift to the proactive paradigm in order to obtain convictions in 
these cases.  The following two research questions examine this issue. 
 
2. Has the proactive political environment of the post-9/11 era resulted in changes to 
how prosecutors process cases and charge defendants? 
The government’s shift from reactive to proactive policies has produced numerous 
changes in the FBI and U.S. attorney’s procedures.  First, early intervention of law 
enforcement should result in fewer counts per indictment as they are interrupting terrorist 
activity earlier in the planning process.  In other words, the terrorist will likely be charged 
with fewer counts per indictment in the post-9/11 era because they are prevented from 
committing further crimes.  This line of reasoning also applies to count severity.  If the 
FBI and other government agencies are adhering to the new AG guidelines, then terrorist 
activity is being interrupted earlier.  Therefore charge severity should decrease in the 
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post-911 era because terrorists are being caught before they can commit more severe 
crimes.  Based on the above discussion, one would expect the number of counts per 
indictment and count severity to be lower post-9/11.  To test these, the following 
hypotheses have been developed: 
H2 The number of counts per indictment will be lower for post-9/11 cases than 
among pre-9/11 cases. 
H3 Count severity will decrease post September 11th. 
In theory, the FBI is disrupting terrorist activity before planning can progress into 
completed acts of terrorism.  Following this logic, the number of defendants should 
decrease in the post-9/11 era, because law enforcement is disrupting terrorist activity 
before more individuals can be involved in the conspiracy.  To test this, I created the 
following: 
H4 The average number of defendants per case post September 11th will decrease. 
In order for the government to appear proactive and aggressive in its pursuit of 
terror cases, research has shown U.S. attorneys are more apt to offer plea bargains.  I 
postulate this could be due to several reasons.  First, the authorities may be collecting less 
evidence in the investigation process.  This diminished amount of evidence makes cases 
more difficult to prosecute, and in turn, affects how attorneys treat defendants. 
Second, instead of being politicized as terrorists, defendants are treated more like 
traditional offenders and subsequently, act more like traditional defendants, and plead 
guilty at higher rates (Shields et al. 2009).  Based on these assumptions, one would 
expect plea rates in terrorist cases to be more similar to plea-rates among traditional 
offenders.  Plea rates are often measured in two different ways.  I created two hypotheses 
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and tested each measure of plea bargains in the post-9/11 era.  With the first hypothesis, I 
examined the proportion of plea bargains of all convictions post September 11th.  
H5A There will be an increase in plea bargaining post September 11th. 
With the second plea bargain hypothesis, I examined all post-9/11 case outcomes 
(dismissals, plea bargains, trial convictions, and acquittals).  I did this to examine what 
percentage of cases resulted in plea bargains post-9/11.  I created the following 
hypothesis to test this information. 
H5B The total percentage of plea bargains will be higher post September 11th.  
 
3. Have cases been prosecuted sooner with less evidence resulting in fewer 
convictions per indicted count in the post-9/11 era? 
Previously the FBI infiltrated terrorist organizations to gather information.  
However, the Ashcroft guidelines emphasized the need for early intervention where these 
techniques were no longer a priority.  The new policy stressed the importance of 
intercepting and interrupting terrorist groups before plans could be made and achieved.  
Due to the new emphasis on early intervention, it follows that in the post-9/11 era, 
evidence derived from confidential informants and undercover agents would decrease.  I 
tested that proposition with the following hypothesis:   
H6 The prosecutor will have less evidence due to less time to infiltrate terrorist 
groups in the post September 11th era. 
 
 If the literature is correct, and the U.S. attorneys have offered more pleas, one 
should be able to quantify the increase.  Along those lines, one possible tactic would be to 
indict suspects on as many charges as possible and later negotiate plea bargains by 
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dropping some charges that, perhaps, didn’t have substantial evidence in the first place.  
This approach of ‘excessive charging’ should result in more unconvicted counts per 
indictment post-9/11 because of this lack of evidence.  To test this assumption, I created 
the following hypothesis: 
H7 The percentage of unconvicted counts per indictment will increase post 
September 11th. 
 
4. Have conviction rates increased after September 11th? 
 A gauge of success can be measured in conviction rates, as they indicate the 
efficiency with which the prosecution processes cases.  Using a surrogate measure of 
evidentiary strength, Shields (2009) found that the early intervention strategy has 
significantly reduced the amount of evidence collected by undercover agents and 
confidential informants.  However, despite the fact that less evidence was being gathered, 
research conducted by Shields et al. (2009) indicates conviction rates for terrorist 
defendants tried after 9/11 is significantly higher than it was before. 
Another aspect of the early intervention era is pressure on the FBI and U.S. attorneys 
to intercept and prosecute cases faster.  Some contend that event-linked style prosecution 
is used less frequently due to a reduced amount of information available to U.S. attorneys 
(Shields et al. 2009).  To determine whether that contention is correct, I tested the 
following hypothesis: 
 H8 Proactive policies post September 11th will result in higher conviction rates. 
V. Methods 
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 The data used in this study came from two sources.  The first data source is from 
the FBI’s annual report titled Terrorism in the United States.  This report began in the 
early 1980’s and was the first official account of terrorism in the United States.  It 
documents multiple features including completed incidents and preventions by year, 
successful techniques used to combat terrorism, terrorist groups, arrests, indictments, and 
convictions.  It also offers the number of killed or injured in an attack as well as 
descriptive statistics by group, target, and type of incident. 
 The second data source is the American Terrorism Study (ATS).  The ATS 
includes federal terrorism cases dating back to 1980 and represents a nearly complete 
record of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Program from 1983-2004.   
 The FBI’s Terrorist Research and Analytical Center released a list of persons 
indicted as a result of investigation under the FBI’s Counterterrorism Program and 
includes over 200 persons from more than 20 terrorist groups active in the United States 
from 1980-1989.  Since that time, the FBI has released multiple lists to the ATS.  Those 
lists include the names of those indicted, the federal district court in which the 
indictments were issued, the federal court case numbers, date of arrest and indictment, 
and the name of the terrorist group involved (Shields et al. 2009).  A case becomes public 
record once an indictment is issued.  ATS staff retrieved cases “stored in the federal 
criminal case files housed at the federal district courts where the cases were tried” 
(Shields et al. 2009:130).  Currently, the ATS database comprises information on over 
700 indictees charged with roughly 9,600 criminal violations (Shields 2008).    
The ATS database was recoded into a new database called Measuring 
Intervention Success in Countering Terrorism (MISCT) using the Statistical Package for 
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the Social Sciences (SPSS).  The objective of this study was to determine whether federal 
efforts to intervene earlier in terrorism activities have been successful in preventing 
terrorist incidents from occurring.  If the new proactive policies have been successful, 
one would expect significant changes in the manner and strategies used to counter 
terrorism.  Both the FBI’s annual report and the ATS used congruent dates (1983-2004).   
Cases were sorted based on two criteria.  First, cases with indictment dates prior 
to September 11, 2001, were categorized as pre-9/11, while cases with indictment dates 
after September 11, 2001, were categorized as post-9/11.  Second, cases were labeled as 
either “preventions” or “completions” based on an analysis of the categorization 
identified in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s annual report.  Any inconsistencies 
between court case documents and the FBI reports were addressed on an individual basis.   
 
Variables and Analysis 
I derived the MISCT data from the ATS database and the Terrorism in the United 
States annual reports.  I created MISCT by generating a dichotomous variable called 
prevention (prev).  I recoded the ATS nominal level variable intended target (int_tar1) to 
create the Prevention variable.   Intended target is a measure of the first target a 
defendant intended to attack but did not hit.  If the defendant was charged with 
attempting to hit a target, the value was coded 1, if there was no target, the value was 
coded 0. 
I created MISCT completions (comp) by recoding the ATS nominal level variable 
actual target (act_tar1) into a dichotomous variable.  The ATS variable Actual target 
indicates that a target was actually hit.  If the target was hit, the variable was coded with a 
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1 and all others were coded with a 0.  This ensures the MISCT database only includes 
prevented and completed acts. 
September 11th, is a dichotomous variable that segregates cases indicted before 
September 11, 2001 and cases indicted after September 11, 2001.  This allows 
partitioning of the data into two samples based on the temporal components that were 
important for this research investigation.  ATS demographic variables were first assessed 
using the grouping variable September 11th.  Gender (sex) is a nominal level variable in 
which male is coded 1, and female is coded 0.  Age (age) is a ratio level variable and 
coded in years of age at indictment. 
Figure B is an operationalized table of how I tested my hypotheses.  Not included 
in the table are the two demographic variables, gender and age.  I tested these variables 
using frequency distributions with the grouping variable September 11th (0 = pre-9/11, 1 
= post-9/11).  I limited the database to indictee level analysis (one line of data on 1st 
count in each case that a person has been indicted) to examine hypotheses one to five. 
 
 Hypothesis One: Early intervention should result in an increase in the ratio of 
 prevented to completed acts of terror in the post-9/11 era. 
 To examine the ratio of prevented to completed acts in the post-9/11 era, I used 
the preventions and completions variables.  These variables were sorted using the 
grouping variable September 11th.  I used an independent samples t-test with these 
variables to assess the ratio of preventions to completions pre and post September 
11th. 
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Hypothesis Two: The number of counts per indictment will be lower for post-9/11 cases 
 than among pre-9/11 cases. 
 In order to analyze if there were fewer counts per indictment post September 11th, 
 I used a variable called total counts per indictment (totalcts).   This variable is a 
 scale level variable and measures the total number of counts per indictment filed 
 against each defendant.  Employing the dependent variable Total counts per 
  indictment I used an independent samples t-test with the grouping variable 
 September 11th to determine the average number of counts per indictment pre and 
 post September 11th.   
  
Hypothesis Three: Count severity will decrease post September 11th. 
 Count severity (ct_sev) is an interval level variable which ranges from 1 to 29:1 
representing the lowest severity of charges, and 29 representing the highest 
severity of charges.  Count severity was used to determine the average level of an 
offense.  This variable was sorted using the grouping variable September 11th.  To 
test hypothesis three, I used an independent samples t-test with the grouping 
variable to determine the average severity of charges pre and post September 11th.   
 
Hypothesis Four: The average number of defendants per case post September 11th will 
decrease. 
 To determine the number of defendants per case, I analyzed the ordinal level 
variable defendant number (defendnu).  This variable measures the number of 
defendants per case.  To examine this hypothesis at the case level, I used the case 
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selection variable to find the first defendant in each case (ct_num = 1 & case = 1).  
Then I sorted the sample using the grouping variable September 11th.  To test 
hypothesis four, I used an independent samples t-test with the total number of 
defendants in case variable and September 11th grouping variable to determine the 
mean number of defendants per case pre and post September 11th. 
 
Hypothesis Five A: There will be an increase in plea bargaining post September 11th. 
 Case result (case_res) is a nominal level variable which is coded into the ATS 
with more than 20 possible outcomes.  To specifically examine plea bargaining, I 
recoded this variable into a dichotomous variable called Plea Misct (plea_misct).  
I coded anything resulting in a plea as 1 and anything resulting in a trial 
conviction as 0.  I coded all other possible outcomes as system missing.  I used 
Plea Misct to examine the percentage of plea bargains of total convictions.  I 
sorted this variable using the grouping variable September 11th.   
I analyzed hypothesis 5A using an independent samples t-test with the recoded 
variable plea misct  and the September 11th grouping variable to determine the 
proportion of plea bargains to total convictions pre and post September 11th.   
 
Hypothesis Five B: The total number of plea bargains will be higher post September 11th 
 I recoded the case result variable (case_res) into a categorical variable.  I coded 
 no conviction as a 1, plea bargains a 2, trial convictions a 3, and acquittals a 4.  I 
 labeled this variable outcome recode (outcomerecode).  I tested the outcome 
 recode variable at the indictee level analysis.  Then, I sorted this variable using 
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 the grouping variable September 11th.  I examined hypothesis 5B by using a cross-
 tabulation to determine the distribution of case outcomes in the pre and post-9/11 
 samples.  This determined the proportion of dismissal, plea bargain, trail 
 conviction, and acquittals pre and post-9/11.   
 
Hypothesis Six: The prosecutor will have less evidence due to less time to infiltrate 
terrorist groups. 
 In order to examine if the government has less evidence post September 11th, I 
 used two variables called confidential informant (infor_mem) and undercover 
 agent (infl_gov).  Confidential informant is a dichotomous variable that measures 
 whether a confidential informant was used in the case.  I coded cases that used a 
 confidential informant as 1, all others were coded 0.  Undercover agent is a 
 dichotomous variable that measures if a government agent infiltrated a terrorist 
 group.  I identified cases in which an undercover agent was used, and coded them 
 1, all others I coded 0.  I tested these variables on two different levels: case level 
 and indictee level analysis.  I sorted the samples using the grouping 
 variable September 11th.  
 For Hypothesis six, I limited the database to case level analysis and indictee level 
 analysis. I used an independent samples t-test with the September 11th grouping 
 variable.  I used the dependent variables confidential informant and undercover 
 agent to determine the proportion of cases that use confidential informants and 
 undercover agents pre and post September 11th.   
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Hypothesis Seven: The percentage of unconvicted counts per indictment will increase 
post-9/11. 
 To determine if the percentage of unconvicted counts per indictment has 
increased post-9/11, I created a new variable called ratio count (ratio_count). 
Ratio count is a ratio level variable which represents the number of unconvicted 
counts per indictment divided by the total number of counts per indictment.  I 
sorted the samples using the grouping variable September 11th.  I again limited the 
database to indictee level analysis for hypotheses seven.  Using the variable ratio 
count, I used an independent samples t-test with the September 11th grouping 
variable to compare the average number of unconvicted counts per indictment per 
and post September 11th.   
 
Hypothesis Eight: Proactive policies post September 11th will result in higher conviction 
rates.   
  I recoded the case result variable (case_res) into a dichotomous variable I called 
outcome (outcome_misct) in which a conviction of any kind received a 1.  
Everything else received a 0.  I tested the new recoded variable outcome at the 
person level analysis (one line of data per person on 1st count in 1st indictment).  I 
sorted these variables using the grouping variable September 11th.   
I limited the database to person level analysis.  I used the independent samples t-
test with the September 11th grouping variable.  I used the dependent variable 
outcome to determine the proportion of convictions pre and post September 11th.   
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Analytical Methods 
Figure B 
Analytical Methods Table 
 
Hypotheses Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Statistical 
Test 
Unit of 
Analysis 
H1  Early 
intervention 
should result 
in an increase 
in the ratio of 
prevented to 
completed acts 
of terror in the 
post 
September 
11th era 
September 
11th  
(sept_11) 
Completed 
(comp) 
Prevented (prev) 
Independent 
Samples T- 
Test 
Indictee 
Level 
H2  The 
number of 
counts per 
indictment 
will be lower 
for post-9/11 
cases than 
among pre-
9/11 cases. 
September 
11th  
(sept_11)) 
Total counts per 
indictment 
(totalcts) 
Independent 
Samples T- 
Test 
Indictee 
Level 
H3 Count 
severity will 
decrease post 
September 
11th 
September 
11th  
(sept_11) 
Count Severity 
(ct_sev) 
Independent 
Samples T- 
Test 
Indictee 
Level 
H4 The 
average 
number of 
defendants per 
case post 
September 
11th will 
decrease 
September 
11th  
(sept_11) 
Total number of 
defendants in 
case (defendnu) 
Independent 
Samples T- 
Test 
Indictee 
Level 
H5A There 
will be an 
increase in 
September 
11th  
(sept_11) 
Plea Misct 
(plea_misct) 
 
Independent 
Samples T- 
Test 
Indictee 
Level  
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plea 
bargaining 
post 
September 
11th. 
 
H5B The total 
number of 
plea bargains 
will be higher 
post 
September 
11th 
 
 
 
September 
11th  
(sept_11) 
 
 
Outcome 
Recode 
(outcomerecode) 
 
 
Chi Square 
 
 
 
Indictee 
Level 
H6  The 
prosecutor 
will have less 
evidence due 
to less time to 
infiltrate 
terrorist 
  
 
  
September 
11th  
(sept_11) 
Confidential 
Informant 
(infor_mem) 
Undercover 
Agent 
 (infil_gov) 
Independent 
Samples T- 
Test 
Case Level 
and Indictee 
Level 
H7  The 
percentage of 
unconvicted 
counts per 
indictment 
will increase 
post-9/11 
September 
11th  
(sept_11) 
Ratio Count 
(ratio_count) 
Independent 
Samples T- 
Test 
Indictee 
Level 
H8  Proactive 
policies post 
September 
11th will result 
in higher 
conviction 
rates 
September 
11th  
(sept_11) 
Outcome 
(outcome_misct) 
Independent 
Samples T- 
Test 
Person Level 
 
VI. Results 
Introduction 
 I divided the results section into five parts.  First, I created a descriptive statistics 
table of my sample using frequency distributions (refer to Table 1).  I found the database 
contains 476 cases (N=476).  The pre-9/11 sample included 390 cases and the post-9/11 
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sample included 50 cases (36 cases were in the process during the shift in policy and 
were coded as missing).  Variables used in later analysis were also examined in this table.  
Following Table 1, I examined the findings of the basic demographic information.  
 I divided the remaining four sections by research question.  Each research 
question is further subdivided by specific hypotheses.  Research question one was my 
umbrella question that if supported, allowed me to further examine my other research 
questions.  The results supported hypothesis one and allowed me to move forward with 
research questions two, three and four.  Results from research question two generally 
supported the hypotheses; however, I did not find support for hypothesis three in which I 
predicted a decrease in count severity.  The next section focuses on the findings for 
research question three.  The results supported all the hypotheses in this section.  I 
present the findings of research question four in the last section.  I did not find support for 
hypothesis eight which predicted an increase in conviction rates post-9/l1.   
 Frequency distributions were used to examine general demographic information 
before the hypotheses were tested.  Using the grouping variable September 11th, I found 
89.1 % of the pre-9/11 sample (N = 339) were male and 88.8 % of the post-9/11 sample 
(N = 47) were male (refer to Table 2).  The average age at indictment in the pre-9/11 
sample was 38.19 (N = 297) and the average age for the post-9/11 sample was 35.64 (N = 
39) (refer to Table 3).  These results were not statistically significant (Levene’s F=.177, 
EVA, p>.05). 
 As indicated by the analytical methods table (refer to Analytical Methods 
section), I used independent samples t-test to analyze the majority of the following 
hypotheses as I compared two groups, pre-9/11 era and post-9/11 era.  Levene’s test for 
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equality of variance tests the variance homogeneity of the groups.  The Levene’s test 
produces two possible outcomes for testing the significance of a t-test: equal variance 
assumed (significance >.05) and equal variances not assumed (significance <.05).  Based 
on the variance produced, I used either equal variance assumed (EVA) or equal variance 
not assumed (EVNA) for each individual hypothesis. 
 
Table 1: MISCT Descriptive Statistics Table 
Variable N   
Measuring Intervention 
Success in Countering 
Terrorism 
N = 476 
 
Pre-9/11 = 390 
Post-9/11 =50 
(36 Missing) 
 
Completed Incidents  
Prevented Incidents  
N = 476 (0 Missing) 
N = 340 
N = 136 
 
71.4% 
28.6% 
Gender N = 475 (1 Missing) 
Males = 413 
Females = 61 
 
86.8% 
12.8% 
Age N = 420 (56 Missing) 
Mean = 37.53 
 
Standard Deviation = 10.77 
Total number of counts per 
indictment 
N = 476 (0 Missing) 
Mean = 7.27 
 
Standard Deviation = 15.21 
Number of defendants per case N = 476 (0 Missing) 
Mean = 7.91 
 
Standard Deviation = 6.54 
Count Severity N = 414 (62 Missing)  
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 Mean = 19.98 Standard Deviation = 8.41 
Percent of plea bargains of 
total convictions 
N = 476 (0 Missing) 
Convictions = 334 
No Conviction = 142 
 
70.2% 
29.8% 
Number of plea bargains of all 
case outcomes 
N = 476 (0 Missing) 
Dismissals = 100 
Plea Bargain = 185 
Trial Conviction = 149 
Acquittal = 42 
 
21.0% 
38.9% 
31.3% 
8.8% 
Did government have 
confidential informant who 
was a group member 
N = 387 (89 Missing) 
No = 90 
Yes = 297 
 
23.3% 
76.7% 
Did government agent infiltrate 
group 
N = 375 (101 Missing) 
No = 253 
Yes = 122 
 
67.5% 
32.5% 
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Table 2: T-test Comparison of Gender Pre-9/11and Post-9/11 
Pre and Post-9/11 Genderα 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Pre-9/11 Gender 
Female 
Male 
Total 
 
37 
302 
339 
 
10.9 
89.1 
100.0 
Post-9/11 Gender 
Female 
Male 
Total 
 
6 
40 
47 
 
11.2 
88.8 
100.0 
α Pre-9/11 N(missing) = 1, α Post-9/11 N(missing) = 2 
 
 
Table 3: T-test Comparison of Mean Age 
 
                       Era N 
 
 
Mean Age Std. Dev 
Age Pre-911 
 297 
38.19 10.854 
  Post-9/11 39 35.64 12.598 
     
  Total 336   
     
         
 
Research Question One Results 
Hypothesis 1 
First, I tested hypothesis one to determine if the proactive polices of the post-9/11 
era were successful in preventing terrorist incidents.  I hypothesized that early 
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intervention should result in an increase in the ratio of prevented to completed acts of 
terror in the post September 11th era.  The results of my analyses are presented in Table 4.  
Pre-9/11 completed incidents had a mean of .71 while post-9/11 completed incidents had 
a mean of .40.  The results indicate a significant decrease in completed acts of terrorism 
post September 11th (Levene’s F=.013, EVNA, p<.001).   
 
Table 4: T-test Comparison of Mean Completed Incidents 
   Era N 
Mean 
Completed 
Incidents 
Std. 
Deviation 
Completed 
Incidents 
pre 9/11 340 .71 .454 
  post 9/11 47 .40 .496 
                      
 
Research Question Two Results 
Research question two examines how the changes made after September 11th have 
affected the strategies prosecutors use to process cases and charge defendants.  
Hypothesis two through hypothesis five B were tested to help answer research question 
two.  
Hypothesis 2 
The results of my analysis of hypothesis two are presented in Table 5.  The 
findings point to a significant decrease in the total number of counts per indictment post-
9/11.  The results of the independent samples t-test indicate that the number of counts per 
indictment were lower for post-9/11 cases (mean=13.81) than among pre-9/11 cases 
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(mean=13.81).  These results were statistically significant (Levene’s F=.001, EVNA, 
p<.001). 
Table 5: T-test Comparison of Mean Number of Counts per Indictment  
   
   Era N 
Mean 
Counts per 
Indictment Std. Deviation 
Total Number of 
Counts in 
Indictment 
pre 9/11 
326 13.81 14.608 
  post 9/11 47 7.91 8.174 
 
Hypothesis 3  
 Table 6 presents the results of a t-test comparison of count severity pre and post-
9/11.  I hypothesized that count severity would decrease post-9/11.  However, the results 
did not support this conclusion.  The average severity of charges in pre-9/11 terrorism 
cases was 19.69 while the average severity of charges in post-9/11 cases was 21.15.  As 
indicated by Table 6, there was not a statically significant decrease in count severity post 
September 11th (Levene’s F=.036, EVNA, p>.05).   
Table 6: T-test Comparison of Mean Count Severity  
   Era N 
Mean 
Severity of 
Charge Std. Deviation 
Count Severity pre 9/11 
 284 19.69 .538 
  post 9/11 46 21.15 1.141 
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Hypothesis 4 
I hypothesized that the average number of defendants per case would decrease 
post-9/11.  The results of the independent samples t-test, as seen in Table 7, indicates the 
average number of defendants per case was lower for post-9/11 cases (mean=1.72) than 
among pre-9/11 cases (mean=3.72).  The findings of hypothesis four are statistically 
significant (Levene’s F=.002, EVNA, p<.001). 
Table 7: T-test Comparison of Mean Defendants per Case 
 
   Era N 
Mean 
Defendants 
per Case Std. Deviation 
Number of 
Defendants in Case 
pre 9/11 104 3.72 4.343 
  post 9/11 29 1.72 1.667 
 
Hypothesis 5A 
 I examined plea bargaining using two separate techniques.  First, I used an 
independent samples t-test to determine the percentage of plea bargains of total 
convictions.  As shown in Table 8, plea bargaining represented 49% of all convictions in 
the pre-9/11 era.  In the post-9/11 era, plea bargaining represented 85% of all convictions 
(refer to Table 8).  These findings support my hypothesis that the percentage of plea 
bargaining of total convictions increased in the post-9/11 era and are statistically 
significant (Levene’s F=.000, EVNA, p<.001). 
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Table 8: T-test Comparison of Plea Bargains of Total Convictions 
 
   Era N 
Mean Plea 
Bargains of 
Total 
Convictions Std. Deviation 
Plea Bargains of 
Total Convictions 
pre 9/11 243 .49 .501 
  post 9/11 34 .85 .359 
 
 
Hypothesis 5B 
 For testing hypothesis five B, I used a cross tabulation to examine all possible 
case outcomes pre and post September 11th.  More specifically, I focused on changes in 
plea bargain use pre and post-9/11.  I compared pre-9/11 case outcomes to post-9/11 case 
outcomes.  Case outcomes included: dismissal, plea bargain, trial conviction, and 
acquittals.  As indicated by Table 9, plea bargains dramatically increased from 35.6% of 
total case outcomes pre-9/11 to 60.0% of total case outcomes post-9/11.  These results 
were statistically significant (p<.001).   
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Table 9: T-test Comparison of Plea Bargains of Case Outcomes 
Case Outcomes Pre 9/11 Post 9/11 Total 
Dismissal Count 70 13 83 
 % within post-9/11 17.9% 26.0% 18.9% 
 % of Total 15.9% 3.0% 18.9% 
Plea Bargain Count 139 30 169 
 % within post-9/11 35.6% 60.0% 38.4% 
 % of Total 31.6% 6.8% 38.4% 
Trial 
Conviction 
Count 141 5 146 
 % within post-9/11 36.2% 10.0% 33.2% 
 % of Total 32.2% 1.1% 33.2% 
Acquittal Count 40 2 42 
 % within post-9/11 10.3% 4.0% 9.5% 
 % of Total 9.1% .5% 9.5% 
Total Count 390 50 440 
 % within post-9/11 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 % of Total 88.6% 11.4% 100.0% 
 
 
Research Question Three Results 
Hypothesis 6  
Research question three examines whether cases have been prosecuted sooner 
with less evidence resulting in fewer convictions per indicted count in the post-9/11 era.  
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I hypothesized the prosecutor would have less evidence due to less time to infiltrate 
terrorist groups post-9/11.  I found the results supported hypothesis six both at case level 
analysis and indictee level analysis.  Pre-9/11 informant use had a mean of .73 (refer to 
Table 10 for Case Level) and a mean of .83 (refer to Table 11 for Indictee Level) while 
post-9/11 informant use had a mean of .20 (refer to Table 10 for Case Level) and a mean 
of.18 (refer to Table 11 for Indictee Level).  There is a significant decrease in the use of 
informants post September 11th (refer to Table 10 for Case Level, Levene’s F=.115, 
EVA, p<.001) (Refer to Table 11 for Indictee Level, Levene’s F=.834, EVA, p<.001). 
I also found undercover agent use significantly decreased in the post-9/11 era.  
Pre-9/11 cases had a mean of .37 (refer to Table 10 for Case Level) and a mean of .39 
(refer to Table 11 for Indictee Level).  Post-9/11 cases had a mean of .04 (refer to Table 
10 for case level) and a mean of .03 (refer to Table 11 for Indictee Level).  These findings 
are statistically significant (refer to Table 10 for Case Level, Levene’s F=.000, EVNA, 
p<.001)(Refer to Table 11 for Indictee Level Levene’s F=.000, EVNA, p<.001).  
 
Table 10: T-test Comparison of Evidence Gathered Using Case Level Analysis 
 Era N Mean Evidence Std. Dev. 
Informant Use Pre 9/11 88 .73 .448 
 Post  9/11 25 .20 .408 
Undercover Use Pre 9/11 88 .73 .448 
 Post 9/11 25 .20 .408 
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Table 11: T-test Comparison of Evidence Gathered Using Indictee Level Analysis 
 
 Era N Mean Evidence Std. Dev. 
Informant Use Pre 9/11 321 .83 .380 
 Post  9/11 33 .18 .392 
Undercover Use Pre 9/11 309 .39 .489 
 Post 9/11 33 .03 .174 
 
        
 
 Hypothesis 7  
 Hypothesis 7 predicted the percentage of unconvicted counts per indictment 
would increase in the post-9/11 era.  I found the percentage of unconvicted counts per 
indictment pre-9/11 was roughly 37%, while the percentage of unconvicted counts per 
indictment post-9/11 was about 82% (refer to Table 12).  These results are statistically 
significant and support my hypothesis that the ratio of unconvicted counts per indictment 
increased post September 11th (Levene’s F=.000, EVNA, p<.05). 
 
Table 12: T-test Comparison of Unconvicted Counts per Indictment 
  
 
   Era N 
Mean 
Number of 
Unconvicted 
Counts per 
Indictment 
Std. 
Deviation 
Unconvicted Counts 
per Indictment 
pre 9/11 323 .3678 .334 
  post 9/11 47 .8227 1.158 
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Research Question Four Results 
In the final research question I sought to determine how conviction rates changed 
after September 11th.  
Hypothesis 8  
Hypothesis eight predicted conviction rates would increase post-9/11.  However, I 
did not find support for this hypothesis as indicated in Table 13.  Pre-9/11 cases had a 
mean of .71 while post-9/11 cases had a mean of .72.  These results fail to support the 
hypothesis that conviction rates increased in the post-9/11 era (Levene’s F=.802, EVA, 
p>.05).  
Table 13: T-test Comparison of Convictions 
              
 
VII. DISCUSSION 
 Following the attacks of September 11th, Attorney General Ashcroft created new 
guidelines that enhanced the FBI’s power to investigate domestic terrorism (Ashcroft 
2002).  Such expansions of authority included greater flexibility in the length and scope 
of investigations.  Prosecutors were also expected to prosecute potential threats earlier to 
interrupt possible attacks (Shields 2008).  The goal of this study was to determine if the 
proactive policy changes initiated after September 11th have been effective in countering 
    Era N 
Mean 
Convictions Std. Deviation 
Convictions pre 9/11 340 .71 .452 
  post 9/11 47 .72 .452 
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terrorism, and if so, what kind of changes have been adopted to the prosecution of 
domestic terrorism cases. 
 I developed four research questions based on the history of terrorism in the United 
States and the current literature concerning the prosecution of terrorism cases.  Results 
from the first analysis, which focused on demographic information, indicted that there 
were no significant differences between the age and gender of pre-9/11 and post-9/11 
terrorists.   Both pre and post-9/11 terrorists are almost exclusively male with an average 
age of mid-to-late thirties. 
RESEARCH QUESTION ONE DISCUSSION 
 My overarching research question was to determine whether the proactive policies 
have been successful in preventing terrorist attacks.  I hypothesized that the intervention 
strategy post-9/11 would result in an increase in prevented terrorist’s incidents and a 
decrease in completed terrorist attacks.  I found a statistically significant increase in the 
ratio of preventions to completions post-9/11 (refer to Graph 1).  This suggests the 
proactive policies post September 11th have been successful in intercepting and 
interrupting terrorist activity before attacks could be completed. 
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Graph 1 
 
 
 
 RESEARCH QUESTION TWO DISCUSSION 
 After determining there was a significant difference in preventions to completions 
post-9/11, I examined my second research question.  Research question two focused on 
how the changes made after September 11th have affected the strategies prosecutors use 
to process cases and charge defendants.  The majority of the hypotheses I tested were 
supported.  Specifically, there was a significant decrease in the total number of counts per 
indictment post-9/11, the average number of defendants decreased post-9/11 and plea 
bargaining increased both in percentage of total convictions and as a case outcome. 
 I had hypothesized that the emphasis of the AG Guidelines to intervene sooner 
would logically result in a decrease in the total number of counts per indictment as 
defendants were intercepted before they could commit more crimes.  Results from 
hypothesis two supported this conclusion, and it stands to reason, if there are fewer 
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crimes being committed, then there should be fewer counts per indictment in the post-
9/11 era.  Again, I found support for this hypothesis but there is another possible 
explanation for the decrease in total number of counts per indictment; fewer counts per 
case might be the result of prosecuting cases sooner with less evidence (see discussion 
below). 
 Likewise, I hypothesized that if law enforcement was intervening earlier, the 
average number of defendants would decrease post-9/11 because terrorists have less time 
to incorporate more individuals into larger, more evolved conspiracies.  I found support 
for this hypothesis.  As demonstrated in Table 7, pre-9/11 terrorism cases averaged 
roughly four defendants while post-9/11 terrorism cases averaged roughly two defendants 
per case. 
 Plea bargains increased in both ways it was examined.  85% of total convictions 
were plea bargained in the post-9/11 era, a dramatic increase from 49% pre-9/11 (refer to 
Table 8).  Also, when plea bargaining was examined as a case outcome among other case 
outcomes, plea bargaining represented the largest percentage, 60%, followed by 
dismissals at 26% (refer to Table 9).  Arguably, the percentage of plea bargains of total 
convictions increased post-9/11 for a number of reasons.  One, the stigma of being 
labeled a terrorist after a terrorism incident such as the attacks on September 11th might 
steer defendants away from trial and the danger of a hostile jury.  Two, prosecutors 
instructed to prosecute terrorism cases faster, may have less evidence in the post-9/11 era 
(see discussion below).  With support for both of these hypotheses, I believe that it’s 
possible that prosecutors are more likely to offer plea bargains and treat terrorists like 
traditional defendants to maintain a high conviction rate.  This also serves an important 
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goal of the post-9/11 policy shift: prosecutors appear more proactive in the prosecution of 
terrorism.   
 My analysis of hypothesis five B showed an increase in plea bargains among all 
possible case outcomes.  The percent of plea bargains almost doubled in the post-9/11 era 
(refer to Table 9).  Despite the increase in pleas, dismissals increased from 17.9% pre-
9/11 to 26.0% post-9/11, an increase of just over 8% post-9/11.  This suggests 
prosecutors were taking fewer cases to trial post-9/11.  One possible explanation for this 
shift in strategy is the lack of evidence available to prosecute a terrorism case effectively.  
If the surrogate measure for evidence is accurate and the findings are to be believed, then 
one would expect more cases to be dismissed and the prosecutor more willing to enter 
pleas.  These findings further help to explain the increase in the percentage of plea 
bargains of total convictions despite the fact conviction rates did not increase (see 
discussion below).  If prosecutors are dismissing more cases in the post-9/11 era, and 
increasing plea offers, it is reasonable that the percentage of plea bargains would 
dramatically increase both as a case outcome and as a percent of total convictions post-
9/11. 
 I did not find support for all the hypotheses associated with research question two.  
I stated in hypothesis three that count severity would decrease post-9/11.  The results for 
count severity were statistically insignificant and were virtually unchanged from one era 
to the next.  I reasoned that law enforcement was intercepting terrorists before higher 
severity crimes could be committed.  However, terrorism cases did not encounter a 
decrease in severity after September 11th, which means that defendants in the post-9/11 
era were being charged with counts of similar severity.  One possible explanation for 
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these results is although, the lead offensive charge has remained relatively consistent pre 
and post-9/11, prosecutors are dropping more charges with lower severity to gain a plea 
agreement.  I tested this proposition with hypothesis three and seven and found the 
number of unconvicted counts per indictment increased (refer to Table 12) post-9/11 but 
the lead offensive remains relatively constant (see discussion of research question 3).  It 
is important to point out that count severity for the lead offense is not a measure of case 
complexity.  One possible measure of case complexity would be an analysis of complex 
conspiracies in both eras, but that analysis was beyond the scope of this inquiry and 
presents a great area for future research. 
RESEARCH QUESTION THREE DISCUSSION 
 I found support for all the hypotheses during my analysis of the third research 
question.  I asked whether the early intervention strategy has resulted in less evidence 
which consequently, has resulted in fewer convictions per indicted count post-9/11.  I 
hypothesized that prosecutors would have less evidence in the post September 11th era 
due to less time to infiltrate terror groups.  In hypotheses six and seven I found support 
for that proposition.  Using the average number of informants and undercover agents per 
case as a surrogate measure of evidentiary strength, the analyses revealed that both 
informant and undercover agent use significantly decreased post-9/11 (both at a case 
level and indictee level).  This should not come as a surprise.  The AG Guidelines no 
longer emphasized infiltrating terrorist groups to gather information and build a strong 
case against the principle activist like in previous administrations; rather, the goal of the 
proactive approach was to disrupt terrorist activity once charges could be made.  The aim 
was to nip criminal plots in the bud before more intricate conspiracies might develop. 
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 The results of hypothesis six serve as a possible explanation for the findings of 
hypothesis seven.  Based on my surrogate measure of evidentiary strength, prosecutors 
had less evidence available to them in the post-9/11 era.  Undercover agent and informant 
use significantly decreased both at the case level (undercover agent use decreased 33% 
and informant use decreased 53%) and indictee level (undercover agent use decreased 
36% and informant use decreased 65%).  It stands to reason, then, the number of 
unconvicted counts per indictment would increase post-9/11 as there is less evidence to 
gain a conviction on every charge.  Prosecutors on average were winning convictions of 
roughly 63% of all counts they filed per case pre-9/11.  Conversely, in the post-9/11 era, 
prosecutors won convictions on approximately 18% of counts filed per case.  These 
findings are “likely the result of an unintended consequence of Attorney General 
Ashcroft’s ‘prosecute early’ policy” (Shields 2008: 144). 
RESEARCH QUESTION FOUR DISCUSSION 
 Finally, in the last research question I sought to examine how conviction rates had 
changed after September 11th.  I hypothesized that conviction rates would increase post-
9/11.  However, I found that conviction rates were virtually unchanged pre-9/11 to post-
9/11.  Prosecutors averaged about a 71% conviction rate pre-9/11 and a 72% conviction 
rate post-9/11.  These findings are particularly noteworthy because though there have 
been significant changes for federal prosecutors, the rate of conviction has remained the 
essentially the same. 
 There are several possible explanations for why these findings remained constant.  
First, as evidenced by Table 9, dismissals and plea bargains have significantly increased 
post-9/11.  As previously discussed, the lack of evidence from undercover agents and 
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informants likely decreased the strength of the prosecutors’ case against defendants.  In 
doing so, the prosecutor is more likely to either dismiss the case or offer a plea bargain.  
Furthermore, prosecutors who are willing to plea are likely more motivated to accept a 
guilty plea on fewer active counts therefore increasing the average number of 
unconvicted counts per indictment (see Table 12 and previous discussion).  While the 
post-9/11 AG Guidelines emphasize faster prosecutions of terrorists, the lack of evidence 
gathered from the early intervention strategy has resulted in conviction rates remaining 
fairly static.   
 Previous research found that conviction rates increased in the post-9/11 era.  My 
findings provide an interesting alternative view into those findings.  Recalling the 
discussion of diffusion cases from section III, Shields (2008) found that conviction rates 
increased substantially in the post 9/11 era.  Shields (2008) findings were based on 
evaluating all cases processed after 9/11 regardless of prosecution strategies.  Shields 
(2008) found diffusion cases significantly increased post-9/11 ("diffusion cases made up 
53% of the cases filed after 9/11") and resulted in higher conviction rates (78).  By 
focusing on prevented and completed acts of terrorism only, my analyses revealed that 
diffusion cases might be masking the outcomes of cases more closely tied to terrorism.  
When cases that did not involve completed or prevented acts of terrorism were removed, 
the conviction rates remained unchanged between eras.  This poses an interesting 
question that should be addressed in future research 
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VIII. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTUTRE RESAERCH 
 This study used Hagan’s structural-contextual theory as the theoretical 
framework.  Again, Hagan argues the different branches of the criminal justice system 
are loosely coupled, and work independently of one another.  Only when a crime elicits 
an intense federal response and brings into being a proactive political environment does 
the system tighten.  Resources are then aimed on one particular form of criminality such 
as terrorism.  For example, following the attacks of September 11th, “funding related to 
defense, homeland security and combating terrorism has been increased by some $145-
160 billion” (Kosiak 2003:7).  Hagan asserts that when these branches function 
collectively as a result of this tightly coupled system, the levels of explained variance in 
sentence outcomes decrease due to less discretion on the part of law enforcement and 
prosecutors.  The attacks on September 11, 2001, and the resulting AG Guidelines shift 
from reactive to proactive, can be viewed as the criminal justice system tightening. 
Using Hagan’s theory, I argue that following September 11th, the United States has 
operated under a tightly coupled system in regards to terrorism.  I predict over time, the 
system will gradually loosen as it has in the past and function again with more autonomy 
and less cross-communication.  I suggest future researchers view structural-contextual 
theory in a less linear manner and more like a pendulum.  The FBI’s authority and power 
have fluctuated over time from very limited restrictions to very limited power. 
Future researchers on the topic should investigate if there has been a shift back to a 
loosely coupled system.  I argue an indicator for the desire to return to a loosely coupled 
system is public discontent.  Reminiscent of the nation’s dissatisfaction after the 
Watergate scandal, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and TSA body scans have already 
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incited heated debates about civil liberty violations.  If public discontent is an indicator of 
the system loosening, then the pendulum is already starting to swing back and the FBI’s 
power and authority might again be limited. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 This study examined the effects the proactive approach has had on the prevention 
of terrorism attacks in the United States, as well as the changes to federal law 
enforcement and federal prosecution strategies.  Overall, terrorism attacks in the United 
States have significantly decreased under the new intervention policy.  It appears the 
FBI’s shift from a reactive agency to a proactive agency has aided in the prevention of 
domestic terrorism. 
 The findings for research question two suggest there have been significant 
changes in how prosecutors prosecute cases and charge defendants.  After September 11th 
and the implementation of the proactive approach, prosecutors averaged fewer counts per 
indictment, fewer defendants per case, and dramatic increases in dismissals and plea 
bargains.  Despite these changes, prosecutors were still charging defendants with roughly 
the same charge severity on lead offense.  In other words, though prosecutors were 
offering more pleas post-9/11, charge severity of lead offense remained essentially 
unchanged. 
 The findings of research question three supported the proposition that the early 
intervention strategy has resulted in less evidence and consequently fewer convictions per 
indicted count post-9/11.  The shift away from infiltrating terror groups to disrupting 
terrorist activity immediately reasonably implies less information gathered from 
undercover agents and informants.  As evidenced from the findings in hypothesis six, 
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both undercover agent and informant use significantly decreased in the post-9/11 era.  
Insufficient evidence could be one possible rationale for why the average number of 
unconvicted counts per indictment increased post-9/11.  With less evidence, and an 
emphasis on faster prosecution, prosecutors are getting convictions of fewer counts per 
indictment post-9/11. 
 Findings of the fourth and final research question indicate that although there 
have been substantial changes to the way prosecutors’ process cases and charge 
defendants the conviction rate has remained relatively stable.  As indicated in the 
previous discussion, the lack of evidentiary strength weakens prosecutors’ ability to win 
convictions.  Taking this into account, it appears prosecutors are more apt to drop a case 
or offer a plea bargain then go to trial without sufficient evidence.  The stress on faster 
prosecution and the change in prosecution strategy does not appear to have made a 
difference in the rate of conviction. 
The current study highlighted some possible explanations for the decrease in 
terrorism incidents and changes in federal law enforcement and prosecution strategies.  
However, there are many influences on pre and post-9/11 justice decisions that are 
beyond the scope of this study, therefore making this area of terrorism research an 
important and interesting area of study with numerous possibilities for future research. 
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